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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Warren L. Swanson and Roger W. Eichmeier*
Evidence Of A Refusal To Submit To
Chemical Intoxication Test Held Admissible;
Prosecutor May Comment To Jury About The
Refusal To Take Test-Following his arrest on
a charge of drunken driving, the defendant was
taken to the police station and asked to submit
to a chemical test designed to determine the
alcoholic content of his blood. The defendant
refused to take the test. At the trial, testimony
regarding the defendant's refusal to take the
test was admitted. Furthermore, in his closing
arguments to the jury, the prosecutor commented upon the defendant's refusal to take the
test. The Supreme Court of South Carolina
affirmed the admission of the evidence and approved the prosecutor's comments. State v.
Smith, 94 S.E.2d 886 (S.C. 1956).
The defendant contended that the admission
of his failure to take the test violated his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
Whether a refusal to take such a test is admissible, the court said, depends initially upon
whether admission of the results of the test
would violate the privilege against self-incrimination, had the police subjected the defendant to the examination. The court adopted
the view that such a compulsory examination
does not violate the self-incrimination privilege.
The privilege, the court indicated, applies only
to testimonial utterances and not to evidence
obtained through an examination of the defendant's person. Because the results of a
compulsory test would not subject a defendant
to self-incrimination, the court concluded that
testimony concerning the defendant's refusal to
take the test is admissible. Such a refusal, the
court said, is a circumstance constituting evidence of guilt which a jury may properly consider. In regard to the prosecutor's comments
about the defendant's refusal to be examined,
* Senior Law Students, Northwestern University
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the court said that a prosecutor may properly
comment to the jury about evidence which has
been admitted. Since evidence of a refusal to
take an intoxication test is admissible, the court
reasoned that such evidence may be commented upon by the prosecutor.
Tape Recording Of 'Truth Serum' Interview
Held Inadmissible-The defendant was indicted on a charge of statutory rape. At the trial,
the prosecution called the victim of the crime as
its chief witness. The witness testified in detail
about the circumstances of the occurrence.
On cross-examination, the defense, in an effort
to impeach the witness, offered in evidence
certain letters and her affidavit, in which the
witness had retracted the charges she had
originally made against the defendant to the
police. In order to rehabilitate the witness, the
prosecution then offered the testimony of a
qualified psychiatrist who testified that, on the
basis of a thorough clinical examination, including psychological tests and a sodiumpentothal test, it was his opinion that the
witness was truthful when she repeated on
direct examination the allegations originally
made by her to police. Over the defendant's
objection a tape recording of the sodium pentothal interview between the psychiatrist and
the witness was then introduced in evidence
and played to the jury. Before the recording was
played, the psychiatrist was allowed to explain
to the jury the use and technique of a sodium
pentothal interview. The psychiatrist testified
that the drug "removes certain inhibitions so
the individual will spontaneously say what the
individual would have said without trying to
exercise control over not saying it... in a
situation such as this it would be a highly
reliable test." In the recording the witness
retold the details of the crime about which she
had personally testified on direct examination.
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The recording also contained several instances
in which the psychiatrist asked the witness
whether she was telling the truth, to which
affirmative replies were given. The trial court
stated that the recording was admitted, not as
substantive evidence, but as a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate the witness
"'or to substantiate, sustain or corroborate the
witness to rebut any inference of impeachment." The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed the defendant's
conviction, holding that a tape recording of a
sodium pentothal interview between a psychiatrist and a witness is inadmissible even as a
prior consistent statement for the limited
purpose of rehabilitating an impeached witness.
Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.
1956).
On appeal, the prosecution argued that the
recording constituted a prior consistent statement which should be admissible to rehabilitate a witness who has been impeached by prior
contradictory statements. The court, however,
adopted the majority view, holding that a prior
consistent statement is only admissible when it
was made at a time when the witness had no
motive to fabricate. In the present case, the
court said, the interview was had for the express purpose of demonstrating the truth of the
witness' original allegations. For this reason, it
was said, there would be a motive to fabricate
unless the drug removed the witness' ability to
fabricate. In order to admit a prior consistent
statement made while under the effects of
sodium pentothal, the court said, the test must
be established as trustworthy and reliable in all
cases. While conceding that narco-analysis is a
useful psychiatric tool, the court indicated that
the reliability of such tests has not been
sufficiently established to warrant admission of
their results as competent evidence. "Scientific
tests", the court said, "reveal that people thus
prompted to speak freely do not always tell the
truth." The court did not consider it necessary
to decide whether a sodium pentothal test is
a competent basis for an expert's opinion as to
a witness' credibility. Although recognizing an
increasing tendency to permit expert psychiatric
opinion as to the credibility of a witness, the
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court said that the recording of the interview
itself should never be heard by the jury.
"Conducting the test itself in their presence",
the court observed, "could not have been more
prejudicial and might have been less so." In
addition, the court criticized the use of the
term "truth serum" in reference to sodium
pentothal. A jury, the court said, might well be
led to believe that anything said under the
drug's influence must be true.
For further discussion of narcoanalysis and
psychiatric testimony, see Macdonald, Truth
Serum, 46 J. CRmb. L., C. & P.S. 259 (1955);
Muehlberger, Interrogation Under Drug Influence, 42 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 513 (1951);
Comment, Psychiatric Testimony for the Impeachment of Witnesses in Sex Cases, 39 J.
Cpmi. L., C. & P.S. 750 (1949).
Seizure Without a Warrant Held Lawful
Where Incident To Arrest For a Parking
Violation-Police officers attached to a gambling investigation detail observed the defendant parking his automobile on a Chicago
street. While leaving his car, the defendant was
accosted by the officers and informed that his
vehicle was standing farther from the curb than
permitted by city ordinance. During the conversation one officer noticed a package protruding from the defendant's pocket. In response to the officer's inquiry, the defendant
stated that the package contained "policy"
slips. Thereupon, the officer, without inserting
his hand in the defendant's pocket, took
possession of the package. The officers then
searched the defendant's car, finding more
policy tickets. The defendant 'was then arrested on a charge of illegal possession of policy
tickets. The defendant was never formally
charged with the parking violation. At the trial,
the defendant's motion to suppress the policy
slips as evidence on the grounds that they were
seized without a search or arrest warrant was
denied. In addition, the trial court denied defendant's offer to prove a general practice
among police of making traffic arrests in connection with gambling violations. The Supreme
Court of Illinois affirmed. People v. Clark, 137
N.E.2d 820 (Ill 1956).
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On appeal, the defendant maintained that
the warrantless seizure of the evidence could not
be justified on the grounds that it occurred
pursuant to a lawful arrest because no arrest
had been made prior to the seizure. The court,
on the other hand, observed that under Illinois
law an arrest may be made without a warrant
for a misdemeanor, as well as a felony, committed in an officer's presence. For this reason,
the court said, if the defendant violated
a municipal parking ordinance in the presence
of the officers, they were authorized to arrest
him without a warrant. In addition, it was
said, where an arrest is justified, an accompanying search is lawful. By the same token, the
court stated, a seizure made without a search is
proper if incident to a lawful arrest. The court
found that a lawful arrest for a traffic violation
had occurred despite the fact that no formal
declaration of arrest was made by the officers.
In addition, the court did not consider significant the fact that the defendant was neither
formally charged nor convicted of the traffic
violation.
As an alternative justification of the seizure
of the evidence, the court said that, because the
package containing the slips protruded from
the defendant's pocket, the offense of illegal
possession of the slips was committed in the
presence of the officers, thereby justifying an
arrest without a warrant and a subsequent
seizure of the tickets. The court easily disposed
of the defendant's offer to prove a practice
among police of making traffic arrests pursuant
to gambling investigations, holding that this
practice had no bearing upon whether the
arrest was lawful.
Federal Gambling Tax Does Not Apply To
Pinball Machines-The defendant was indicted for failure to pay the federal gambling
tax imposed by 26 U.S.C. §4462(a)(2)(1953) on
"so-called slot machines which operate by
means of insertion of a coin, and which, by
application of the element of chance, may deliver or entitle the person playing to receive
cash, premiums, merchandise or tokens." The
defendant operated certain devices commonly known as pinball machines which con-

sisted of a flat board containing a number of
holes. The insertion of a coin released five balls
which could be propelled on to the board by
means of a plunger. By nudging the table, the
player caused the ball to roll into the holes.
Upon attaining a certain score, the player received a number of free games which could
either be played or cancelled in return for a
cash payment from the proprietor. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed the defendant's conviction, holding
that pinball machines are not included within
the language of the federal gambling tax
statute. United States v. Korpan, 237 F.2d
676 (7th Cir. 1956).
The court considered immaterial the fact that
pinball machines may in fact be gaming devices. The only question presented, the court
said, is whether pinball games are included
within the language of the gaming tax act. The
dictionary definition of a slot machine, the
court said, is a machine operated by dropping a
coin in a slot. While this definition would
include pinball machines, the court reasoned
that the use by Congress of the language "socalled 'slot' machines" indicates that a narrower
definition was intended. From an examination
of the legislative history of the statute, the
court concluded that Congress intended to
exclude pinball machines from the category of
gaming devices. In addition, the court said,
gambling devices have been specifically defined
in other federal statutes as those devices
colloquially referred to as "one armed bandits"
rather than pinball machines. The court did not
consider significant the fact that a Treasury
Department regulation includes pinball machines as gaming devices when free plays are
redeemed for cash. Congress, the court said,
cannot be assumed to have intended a Treasury
regulation to state the proper construction of
the statute when that regulation has only
recently been followed.
Police Officer May Not Testify As To Results
Of Alcometer Test Unless He Is Skilled In
Mechanics And Use Of Machine; Judge May
Not Instruct Jury As To Medical Standards
Of Intoxication Unless Such Standards Are In
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Evidence-After his arrest on a charge of
driving while intoxicated, the defendant was
given an alcometer breath test. At the trial, the
police officer who had administered the alcometer test related that the test resulted in a
certain reading. The officer further testified
that according to the standards of the National
Safety Council, the reading produced by the
alcometer indicated that the defendant was
intoxicated. On cross examination, the witness
admitted that he knew nothing about the use
or mechanics of the testing device. Thereafter,
the judge, in his instructions to the jury, explained in detail the operation of the alcometer
and, in addition, read to the jury the medical
standards of intoxication adopted by the
National Safety Council. The Court of Appeals
of Ohio reversed the defendant's conviction.
State v. Minnix, 137 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1956).
The court held that testimony concerning
the results of a test made with a device designed to determine intoxication is in the
nature of expert testimony and, to be competent, a witness must be "skilled, learned or
experienced in the mechanics and use of such
machine, so as to qualify as an expert witness."
If the witness does not have these qualifications, the court said, the defendant would be
denied the opportunity to cross examine the
witness as to the truth and accuracy of the
results of the test. In regard to the judge's
instruction to the jury, the court observed that
a judge may not state to the jury the standards
for intoxication where these standards have
not been previously introduced in evidence.
Evidence Obtained Through Telephone Wire
Tap Held Admissible In State Court-State
police officers tapped the defendant's telephone
line by means of a "drop wire" attached to the
local phone circuit. Defendant's telephone
conversations were then intercepted and recorded on a tape recorder which had been
connected to the "drop wire". As a result of the
conversations, the defendant was arrested on a
charge of bookmaking. At the trial, the state
introduced tape recordings of the intercepted
conversations. On appeal, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held admissible evidence ob-
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tained through the use of a wire tap. State v.
Tracey, 125 A.2d 774 (N.H. 1956).
The court held that wire tap situations were
not covered by a state statute which made it a
felony to injure wires or other materials of a
public utility. Such statutes, the court said,
have been uniformly interpreted in other jurisdictions as applying only to the malicious
damage of utility lines and were not designed to
regulate wire tapping. In addition, the court
said, the Federal Communications Act, which
has been held to prohibit the use in federal
courts of wire tap evidence, has also been held
not to prohibit the admission of such evidence
in state courts. Furthermore, it was said,
evidence obtained through an illegal search and
seizure is admissible in New Hampshire courts.
Examing the policy issues regarding the practice
of wire tapping, the court conceded that this
technique may subject a defendant to blackmail
and encourage illegal enforcement of the law.
On the other hand, the court reasoned, in regard to serious crimes, regulated wire tapping
may be an essential adjunct of effective law
enforcement. In any case, the court said, "there
is no constitutional mandate which requires or
authorizes the judiciary to prescribe a legislative program for the regulation of wire tapping.
If wire tapping is the 'Orwellian horror' depicted
by some, the legislature should make it a crime
and subject it to such regulations as are demanded in the light of modem electronic devices
and discoveries."
Evidence Obtained By Illegal Execution Of
Search Warrant Is Admissible In Federal
Court-Armed with a search warrant, police
officers knocked on the door of the defendant's
home and called out the word "police". Receiving no response, the officers broke open the
door, and, upon entering, seized a number of
lottery tickets. At her trial in a federal district
court, the defendant moved to suppress the
evidence seized during the search on the grounds
that the search warrant was illegally executed
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1953) which
provides that, before forcibly entering a dwelling to execute a search warrant, an officer must
give notice of his "authority and purpose".
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The court denied the defendant's motion. The
court said that, even though the officers did not
specifically state the purpose of their visit, the
announcement that they were police officers
"would give notice to a reasonable person that
the purpose of seeking entry is either to make
an arrest or to make a search and that it was
not just a social visit." The court held that
the statute was therefore substantially complied
with. However, the court indicated that, even
if the statute were not complied with, the evidence would not necessarily be inadmissible.
It is well settled, the court said, that evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment
must be suppressed. On the other hand, the
court observed, evidence illegally obtained is
not rendered inadmissible, unless the illegality
consists of a violation of a constitutional provision. A search made pursuant to a valid
search warrant, the court said, complies with
the fourth amendment.
In the present case, the allegedly violated
statute directed the method by which a valid
search warrant must be executed. Violation
of such a statute, the court held, does not
violate the fourth amendment. Furthermore,
18 U.S.C. § 2234 (1953) imposes a criminial
penalty upon an officer who willfully exceeds
his authority in executing a search warrant.
For this reason, the court concluded, "it cannot
be implied that an additional penalty is imposed upon the public in making the evidence
so obtained inadmissible." United States v.
Freeman, 144 F.Supp. 669 (D.C. 1956).
Based on facts similar to those of the Freeman
case, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit has recently held that the use
of excessive force in serving a valid search
warrant does not render evidence thereby
seized inadmissible. Barrientes v. United States,
235 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
879 (1956).

Opinion Of Arson Investigator As To Cause
Of Fire Held Admissible-The defendaiit was
indicted on a charge of arson. At the trial,
testimony of the fire department officers who
had extinguished the fire was received in evidence. These officers testified that they had
encountered numerous unconnected fires in
various parts of the burning structure and, in
addition, had observed sulphur candles placed
dangerously close to combustible materials.
An assistant fire marshall was then called as a
witness and qualified, on the basis of extensive
experience and training, as an expert in the
investigation of fires. Over the defendant's
objection, the fire marshall was then asked
whether, on the basis of the testimony given by
the fire department officers, and on the basis of
his own investigation of the premises, "he had
formed an opinion as an expert as to the cause
of the fire." He replied that, in his opinion, the
fire was of incendiary origin. On appeal, the
admission of the expert's testimony as to the
cause of the fire was approved. Commonwealth
v. Kauman, 126 A.2d 758 (Super. Ct. Pa. 1956).
The defendant contended that there was
ample evidence from which the jury could
determine the cause of the fire and that the
expert's opinion therefore invaded the function
of the jury. Rejecting this argument, the court
said that a group of laymen could not know the
significance of such evidence as the fact that
several unconnected fires were found in the
building "without some explanation from a
qualified person familiar with various types of
fires and the difference in their nature, acceleration, intensity, types of material, etc." Such
opinion testimony, the court concluded, did
not invade the provence of the jury because the
jury was free to reject the testimony and arrive
at a different conclusion.
(For other recent case abstracts see pp.
696-701, supra.)

